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A Comparative Analysis of Location and Non-Location-Bounded 
Strategic Asset Seeking in Emerging and Developed Market MNEs: An 
Application of New Internalization Theory 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Do emerging market (E)MNEs have a stronger strategic asset seeking  FDI orientation than developed 
market (D)MNEs? If so, what are the properties of the strategic assets they actually seek and are they 
similar or dissimilar to those of DMNEs? Drawing from new internalization theory, we show that 
lying concealed within some mainstream EMNE models are important predictions regarding 
differences in the location-boundedness properties of the strategic assets sought by EMNEs compared 
with DMNEs. Using multinomial logit modelling on 2,414 international M&A deals, we explore how 
acquirer characteristics shape location-bounded (trademark) and non-location bounded (patent) 
strategic asset seeking choices. In general, we find evidence that EMNEs have a comparatively 
stronger patent but weaker trademark seeking orientation than DMNEs. We discuss implications for 
EMNE related theory, focusing on the qualitative differences in asset seeking orientation between 
EMNEs and DMNEs.  
Key words: new internalization theory; emerging market MNEs; location and non-location 
boundedness; strategic asset seeking; FDI 
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Introduction 
An extensive conceptual and empirical literature has emerged exploring strategic asset seeking (SAS) 
in emerging market MNEs (EMNEs) (Luo & Tung, 2018; Meyer, 2015). A couple of questions, 
however, remain under researched. Firstly, do EMNEs have a stronger tendency to engage in SAS 
related FDI than developed market MNEs (DMNEs)? Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, what 
are the properties of the strategic assets EMNEs actually seek and how do their location-boundedness 
properties influence EMNE SAS behaviors? While the first question has received considerable  
conceptual interest, comparative empirical testing of EMNE SAS intensity with respect to DMNEs 
remains under-researched, with a few notable exceptions (Estrin, Meyer, & Pelletier, 2018; Jindra, 
Hassan, & Cantner, 2016). As regards the second question, we still know comparatively little about 
the properties of the strategic assets sought, or whether and how these may differ between EMNEs 
and DMNEs. 
 This is a potentially important question, as SAS related concepts have recently become central to  
debate surrounding rise of EMNEs. The acquisition of such assets is strongly associated with the 
notion of exploratory and asset augmenting internationalization catch-up strategies in late comer 
MNEs. In this regard, a potentially important and distinguishing property of strategic assets sought by 
EMNEs relates to their portability and non-location bounded properties (Meyer, 2015: Hennart, 2012; 
Luo & Tung, 2018). In this view, strategic assets are acquired by EMNEs not with a view to 
necessarily being used in the original host country in which they are acquired, but rather they are 
acquired with a view to becoming employed throughout the EMNE network – to spur global 
competitiveness within the MNE. This particularly includes improved performance in the acquirer’s 
home base (Hennart, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2018). Indeed, strategic assets have been thought of as 
possessing non-location bounded properties in recent conceptualizations (Meyer et al. 2015).1 Despite 
the potential importance of the location boundedness properties of such assets to understanding FDI 
related SAS acquisition strategies in EMNEs, few empirical studies, to our knowledge, have explored 
their impacts.   
New internalization theory, with its focus on the nature and characteristics of firm-specific advantages 
(FSAs) and their diffusion within MNEs, provides potentially useful insights into the above questions 
(Jing Li & Oh, 2016). New internalization theory was developed with the specific purpose of better 
explaining subsidiary specific advantages and their reverse diffusion to parent companies within the 
MNE network (Verbeke & Rugman, 1992).  The “critical extension” made to new internalization 
theory (vis-à-vis “conventional” internalization theory) was its distinction between the different types 
of FSAs that MNEs may possess, specifically focusing on their properties with regards to intra-MNE 
                                                     
1 An idea not originally specified in Dunning’s original formulation of SAS but later incorporated by him and 
commonly implicit in many others that makes use of the concept (Meyer, 2015).  
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transferability (Verbeke & Kano, 2015). FSA location boundedness thus became a major focus of new 
internalization theory (Rugman &Verbeke, 2001; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003; Verbeke & Rugman, 
1992). According to one recent commentary, this distinction signified ‘a quantum leap in the 
development of modern IB research’ (Narula & Verbeke, 2015, p. 615). Despite this leap, and the 
conceptual notion of SAS involving portability (Meyer, 2015), new internalization theory’s focus on 
FSA location boundedness has yet to be extensively applied to research on EMNEs. Indeed, the 
tendency of EMNEs to engage in SAS in their FDI orientation with a view to capability creation via 
intra-MNE (often reverse) knowledge flows is increasingly identified as one of their distinctive 
characteristics (Buckley et al., 2018). As the multidimensionality of FSA diffusion is central to new 
internalization theory, it would appear well suited to the analysis of SAS in EMNEs. 
How does exploring the location boundedness of assets acquired via SAS and comparing them with 
DMNE strategies provide further insights into understanding EMNEs? We argue, following Meyer’s 
(2015) insight regarding appropriate conceptualizations of SAS, that concealed within a number of 
mainstream theoretical approaches to explaining EMNEs, such as Luo and Tung’s (2018) ‘upward 
spiral’ springboard theory and Hennart’s (2012) imperfect locational advantages argument, are 
important predictions regarding the location boundedness properties of the intangible assets sought 
during SAS related FDI. Specifically, some of these models place emphasis on the strong 
gravitational pull of the domestic market as a driver of outward FDI strategies in EMNEs, as well as 
asymmetries in market access (which recently have risen up the agenda as major geopolitical issues: 
witness the current trade and investment disputes between the US and China). These asymmetries 
favor EMNEs. Differences, therefore, are predicted between EMNEs and DMNEs with regards to the 
intensity of the location and non-location-bounded strategic assets they pursue. Further exploring 
differences with regards to the location boundedness of SAS orientation in EMNEs and DMNEs may 
thus provide insights into MNE theory and deepen our understanding of whether (and how) EMNEs 
are different to DMNEs. From a policy perspective, moreover, EMNE SAS intensity and orientation 
have become major geopolitical issues. By comparing how strategic assets shape acquisition choices 
we may shed more light on these issues.  
First, we outline the debate regarding the SAS orientation of EMNEs and then explain the relevance 
of new internalization theory for understanding EMNEs, particularly exploring its key insight related 
to the location boundedness properties of FSAs and their impact on internationalization strategy. 
Second, we explain how some of the mainstream EMNE literature, in assuming the home and other 
third country markets (i.e. not that of the target) are where strategic assets are employed, makes some 
important predictions regarding the location-boundedness properties of the strategic assets sought by 
EMNEs (vis-à-vis DMNEs). Third, we explain our methodology. We use comparative static 
multinomial logit analysis to model the LB and NLB SAS choices of acquirers in international M&As 
of MNEs originating from Brazil, Russia, India and China (i.e. the BRIC markets) and the US and UK 
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(between 2012 and 2016). Incorporating acquirer characteristics we test and compare the choice 
decisions of  DMNEs and EMNEs in acquiring location bounded (LB) and non-location bounded 
(NLB) strategic assets. After reporting the results we reflect further upon the insights that new 
internalization theory can bring to understanding EMNEs, particularly its focus on the properties of 
strategic assets acquired via FDI.   
Literature review 
Mainstream International Business theory, such as internalization theory, has argued MNEs invest 
abroad in order to exploit pre-existing FSAs in new markets. The rise of EMNEs, however, has 
brought this received wisdom into question. This is because EMNEs are sometimes considered not to 
possess traditional FSAs, yet still undertake FDI (Luo & Tung, 2018; Mathews, 2006). Their outward 
FDI strategies, moreover, are thought to be more strongly motivated by SAS than DMNEs, involving 
processes that augment areas of perceived competitive disadvantage, rather than exploitation of 
preexisting FSAs. This is done through the acquisition of a variety of assets which are often intangible 
in nature, such as technologies and brands. Given the proliferation of studies on EMNE SAS 
behaviors, it is unsurprising that numerous SAS related definitions have emerged (Meyer, 2015). 
They have recently been defined, for example, as ‘know-how, technologies, brands, equipment, 
buildings and sites acquired or leased abroad with the aim of creating or extending advantages in the 
future’ (Petersen & Seifert, 2014, p. 381). These assets ‘may reflect a functional, production-related 
proprietary asset, typically technological, manufacturing or marketing knowhow…. [or] it may refer 
to an organizational capability to efficiently coordinate and control the MNE’s asset base’ (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2001: 238). EMNE SAS strategies, therefore, are thought to be driven by their 
comparatively low levels (i.e. absence) of FSAs and their need to ‘catch-up’ with DMNE 
counterparts.  
SAS may be facilitated and aided at times by state support (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010), including 
favorable domestic home market conditions such as: access to complementary local resources  
(Hennart, 2012); asymmetries in liabilities of foreignness (Petersen & Seifert, 2014);  business group 
affiliation (Chari, 2013); and the ability to learn from foreign rivals (Mathews, 2006).  Much research 
has thus highlighted EMNEs’ FDI behavior as being characterized by comparatively rapid, high risk 
SAS investments, often to psychically distant developed markets, for the purposes of firm-level catch-
up (Luo & Tung, 2018). This “asset augmentation” approach of EMNEs is considered distinct from 
traditional “exploitation” strategies in DMNEs and poorly explained by existing theory, prompting 
calls for new or revised theoretical contributions to explain their behaviors (Ramamurti, 2012). 
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 If EMNEs do actively acquire strategic assets, a further logical question follows: are there any 
particular types of strategic assets that they are predisposed towards and do these assets have specific 
properties? And does this further distinguish them from their DMNE counterparts? There are reasons 
for suspecting there may be differences in the properties of the strategic assets sought by EMNEs 
when compared with DMNEs. Specifically, drawing from new internalization theory, we argue 
EMNE related theories, such as the ‘upward spiral’ springboard process (Luo & Tung, 2018) imply a 
stronger attraction towards NLB as opposed to LB assets. We now outline the difference between 
NLB and LB assets and then explain the predictions of some mainstream EMNE related theories 
regarding the SAS intensity towards both NLB and LB assets, considering EMNE and DMNE 
differences. 
New internalization theory and NLB/LB properties of strategic assets 
New internalization theory was specifically proposed by Rugman and Verbeke (1992) as a refinement 
to internalization theory that could account for the potential of FSAs being developed in subsidiaries.  
Thus new internalization theory was considered a “critical extension” to internalization theory, as it 
was considered to better account for the real-life complexity of MNE operations (Verbeke & Kano, 
2015). It moved away from the “stylized”, unidirectional version of FSA creation and diffusion (i.e. 
from parent to subsidiaries) to one more in line with the observed workings of MNEs (subsidiary to 
parent, or intra-subsidiary diffusion, among one of numerous FSA diffusion patterns) (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2001).2  Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2001) thus introduced the idea of LB and NLB FSAs. 
Some FSAs, they argued, might be more easily diffused within the MNE than others, which remained 
“sticky” and bounded to certain locations. The key improvement of  this approach, in their view, 
related to its ability to now better explain how subsidiaries might develop FSAs for intra-MNE 
diffusion: ‘NLB-FSAs need not necessarily originate within the parent company, but may also be 
created by a subsidiary or by joint efforts of the firm's different operations located abroad’  (Verbeke 
& Rugman, 1992, p. 763). They further argued that the location bounded nature of many FSAs could 
explain why many MNEs expanded regionally rather than globally, as in reality many FSAs were LB 
in nature and transferred more easily to similar environments.3 
Rugman and Verbeke’s (1992,2001) contributions in this area, unfortunately, do not provide much 
empirical guidance as to how one might outline ‘the precise nature of non-location-bounded FSAs or 
                                                     
2 They note: ‘too much emphasis was put on both the importance of cost optimization and the danger of FSA dissipation, 
rather than capability creation. In this context, the dominating FDI pattern was one whereby key non location-bounded FSAs 
needed to be transferred from the home country center to host country subsidiaries, and where subsidiary roles were 
determined by the parent company’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001, p. 457). 
3 They questioned whether FSAs, particularly intangible, production-related assets might be easily transferred ‘across 
borders within the firm without too much attention to adaptation or codification problems’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001, p. 
238-239). 
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fully explain what ties them to specific locations’ (Collinson & Rugman, 2008, p. 7). According to 
one of their early definitions, however, NLB FSAs can be ‘exploited globally and lead to benefits of 
scale, scope, or exploitation of national differences… and can be transferred abroad at low marginal 
costs and used effectively in foreign operations without substantial adaptation’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 
2001: 271). By contrast, LB FSAs may benefit firms ‘only in a particular location (or set of locations), 
and lead to benefits of national responsiveness….these location-bounded FSAs cannot easily be 
transferred [via FDI] as an intermediate good and require significant adaptation in order to be used in 
other locations’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001: 271). LB assets, it should be noted,  include such things 
as “local reputation” (Verbeke & Kano, 2015). 
Do EMNEs have a greater SAS orientation towards NLB or LB assets?  
We now explain our hypotheses, firstly employing arguments from the EMNE literature implying 
EMNEs have a stronger NLB orientation. Our second hypothesis, by contrast, predicts EMNEs have a 
weaker attraction to location bounded assets.  
NLB strategic assets, EMNEs and SAS intensity  
A variety of explanations have been suggested to explain the observed SAS orientation of EMNEs.  
As Petersen and Seifert (2014) argue, these may be ordered into two general groups. One group, 
considers the role of specific, often institution related factors, in driving SAS. In the EMNE case, for 
example, the intervention of state policy-makers (at central and local levels) and their impacts on 
EMNEs is sometimes singled out (Luo et al., 2010; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). State 
support, for example, may afford certain firms (like China’s preferred national champion business 
groups) low cost capital (Buckley et al., 2007). Alternatively, business group affiliation may facilitate 
SAS, again possibly via low cost financing (Chari, 2013; Yiu, 2011).  
Petersen and Seifert (2014) argue, however, that an issue with these approaches is that they do not 
accord with observed patterns in SAS, which extends above and beyond specific cases of state 
supported businesses or large business groups and beyond economies where such interventions are 
common (i.e. China). Rather, SAS is observed as a more general phenomenon in EMNEs. Thus, 
explanations should extend beyond these “special case” arguments and provide a more general 
explanation for SAS in EMNEs. A second group of explanations therefore proposes that a set of 
general forces predisposes EMNEs towards SAS more strongly than DMNEs. In particular, the impact 
of the domestic market stands out as being a strong driver of SAS outward (O)FDI in these models 
(Hennart, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018; Petersen & Seifert, 2014). The logic of this perspective 
relates, in part, to Rugman and Li’s (2007) early assertion that FSAs are, to a large extent, determined 
by domestic country specific advantages (CSAs). The growth of EMNEs, it is correctly observed, is a 
direct result of their outstanding domestic market performance (Rugman & Li, 2007). The large 
domestic BRIC markets, for example, have grown strongly over a number of decades. Numerous 
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BRIC EMNEs have experienced exceptional growth on the back of their domestic market successes.  
For such firms the domestic base provides the mainstay of their revenues (most BRIC MNEs, for 
example, still have very low transnationality indexes and earn very low shares of total revenues from 
foreign subsidiaries) (Anderson, Sutherland, & Severe, 2015). As such, many argue that EMNE 
outward FDI is often undertaken as an important means of strengthening domestic market positions, 
sometimes in the face of intensifying foreign competition.  Luo and Tung’s (2007) ‘springboard 
perspective’, for example, and their updated upward spiral process argument (Luo & Tung, 2018), 
emphasizes the central importance of the domestic market as a driver of outward FDI. Springboard 
(S)EMNEs, they argue, may acquire ‘critical resources needed to compete more effectively against 
their global rivals at home and abroad…. Springboard links a firm’s international expansion with its 
home base… Viewed in this manner, the global success of such EMNEs is still highly dependent on 
their performance at home’ (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 484) (emphasis added). 
 According to the springboard view, springboard (S)EMNEs ‘systematically and recursively use 
international expansion to better equip themselves to compete against global rivals, reduce 
vulnerability to home institutions, and fortify their home base to further catapult, domestically and 
internationally’ (Luo & Tung, 2018) (emphasis added).  Indeed, the early stages of the springboard 
process involve SEMNEs repatriating acquired strategic assets back to their domestic market. In this 
regard, Luo and Tung (2018) acknowledge their argument ‘realizes the importance of internalization, 
but it interprets internalization mainly as transferring acquired foreign strategic assets back home’ 
(Luo & Tung, 2018). Other scholars have also highlighted the importance of the domestic arena as a 
motivator of SAS related FDI: ‘EMNEs go abroad to obtain technologies and brands primarily for 
exploitation in their home markets, not abroad’  (Ramamurti, 2012, p. 43). Implicit in much of the 
SAS related EMNE literature is the notion of NLB properties, particularly in acquired target firms 
undertaken via M&A (Meyer, 2015). 
This observed dependence on the domestic market,  has raised a further question: why do DMNEs not 
try and exploit these markets themselves, with their own often superior FSAs (Hennart, 2012; 
Petersen & Seifert, 2014)? Two complementary arguments have been put forward to explain this 
phenomenon, the so-called ‘bundling model’ and ‘asymmetric liability of foreignness’ arguments. 
First, Hennart’s (2012) bundling model argues there are imperfect ‘locational’ advantages (the ‘L’ 
from the ‘OLI’ model) blocking non-domestic market businesses (i.e. DMNEs) from market entry.  
Hennart (2012) asks the question: why do DMNEs willingly choose to sell their intangible FSAs (i.e. 
strategic assets) to EMNE competitors? It may be true, for example, that acquired strategic assets 
create synergies for EMNEs, which often compete primarily on the basis of mass-manufacturing cost 
advantages. It is not clear, however, why DMNEs would not choose to exploit their NLB FSAs and 
look to avail of (emerging market) host market country specific advantages (i.e. low costs, etc.) to 
compete with emerging market firms in their home market. The answer, he argues, is that not all firms 
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can equally access emerging market CSAs. This is because the NLB FSAs of DMNEs must also be 
‘bundled’ at the local level with emerging market CSAs in order to become profitable (in the 
emerging market). Preferential access to local resources for domestic EMNEs, however, allows them 
preferred access to these advantages. Access to complementary local resources (assets which allow 
for the effective deployment of knowledge (i.e. FSAs)) in a given market, such as distribution 
channels, after-sales services or complementary technology thus gives EMNEs vital domestic market 
advantages.4  Elsewhere these have been referred to as ‘home court’ advantages (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
Second, Petersen and Seifert (2014) using a logic related to that of Hennart (2012) (as it predicts 
stronger pervasive forces driving SAS in all EMNEs vis-à-vis DMNEs) arrive at a somewhat similar 
conclusion, albeit from a different route. They argue that DMNEs and EMNEs face asymmetric 
liabilities of foreignness. More specifically, they focus on the structural, relational and institutional 
costs of doing foreign business, with an emphasis on institutional costs.  Emerging markets, such as 
the BRIC markets, are typically considered to suffer from institutional voids, which domestic firms 
become accustomed to dealing with (via, for example, formation of business groups which may lower 
transaction costs (Khanna & Palepu, 1997)). The informal rules and conventions prevalent in such 
institutional contexts are harder for DMNEs to become accustomed to. This contrasts with the more 
formal systems found in developed markets, which EMNEs can learn relatively easily. Their 
argument thus invokes the idea that liability of foreignness is contingent upon the direction of 
investment and not, therefore, symmetric. As a result, EMNEs in general find it easier to navigate the 
institutions, language and culture of developed markets than DMNEs find navigating those of 
emerging markets. Petersen and Siefert (2014) therefore argue that all EMNEs have advantages in 
terms of business practices, culture and language in their domestic market. Furthermore, because of 
asymmetries in liabilities of foreignness between DMNEs and EMNEs when investing in each other’s 
markets, ‘all else equal, it is easier for EMNEs to succeed in developed markets than it is for MNEs to 
succeed in emerging markets’ (Petersen & Seifert, 2014, p. 378).  
The bundling model, asymmetric liability of foreignness and springboard upward spiral arguments all 
explore why there may be a set of general forces at play across emerging markets that motivate SAS.  
They argue that EMNEs often look to use acquired strategic assets domestically, at least in the first 
instance, in part owing to the rents appropriable to NLB intangible assets transferred to their sheltered 
(i.e. DMNEs struggle to enter) domestic markets. DMNEs, by contrast to EMNEs, do not have 
sheltered domestic markets and other barriers such as institutional asymmetries, also are not present. 
Following this logic, we hypothesize: 
                                                     
4 Complementary local resources can be achieved via, for example, participation in domestic business groups and strong 
state-business relationships, those that may be deemed rent-appropriable also include ‘the knowledge of how to incorporate 
these intangibles into products that meet the needs and tastes of local consumers, the logistics necessary to put products 
within their reach, and all the other inputs necessary for local production’ (Hennart, 2012).  
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Hypothesis 1. EMNEs are more strongly attracted to non-location-bounded strategic assets 
than DMNEs when undertaking FDI. 
Location bounded strategic assets and SAS intensity: EMNE v DMNE differences?  
There is considerably less theoretical support to suggest a stronger orientation towards LB assets in 
EMNEs when compared with DMNEs. LB assets cannot be transferred at low cost for potential 
exploitation in the profitable domestic market, or easily elsewhere (Verbeke & Rugman, 1992). As 
such, the value of acquired LB assets cannot very easily be leveraged (to use Mathews’ (2006) 
terminology in his LLL model) throughout the EMNE’s operations (but particularly domestically). 
Building upon the NLB/LB distinction, Lo et al. (2011) have noted three factors which influence the 
location-boundedness of an FSA and may thus potentially act as a deterrent for EMNE related SAS. 
First, research on knowledge transfer has identified ‘tacitness’ as a factor influencing FSA portability. 
FSA tacitness refers to the ‘non-codifiability, non-teachability and complexity’ of an advantage (Lo, 
Mahoney, & Tan, 2011: 283).  Second, the degree of organizational embeddedness and thus the extent 
to which an advantage must be complemented with other elements found within the organization, 
affects FSA transferability (Lo, 2015). The greater the number of complementary elements, the more 
necessary it becomes to transfer the entire organizations’ sub-systems. Lo et al. (2011) provide the 
example of an FSA related to quality control which sits within and cannot be disassociated from an 
entire complex production system. One cannot be transferred in isolation. Third, the ‘environmental 
embeddedness’ refers to the extent to which the FSA is tied to and embedded within the domestic 
environment. For example, the FSAs of Japanese MNEs are closely tied to the human resource 
management practices and keiretsu networks highly embedded in Japan’s unique socio-political and 
cultural environment (i.e. lifetime employment and associated recruitment practices, career paths, job 
rotation systems, training, mentoring and rewards mechanisms are important location-bounded FSAs 
(Collinson & Rugman, 2008)). Similarly, local reputation is embedded in the domestic environment.  
A location bounded asset, like local reputation or brand, for example, may have elements of both 
tacitness and environmental embeddedness. The ability to manage such location bounded assets, 
given their distinctive characteristics, may also require an additional FSA, namely ‘locational 
capability’ (Zaheer & Nachum, 2011). Locational capability refers to the idea that not all markets are 
equally accessible to all MNEs, and that one of the capabilities an MNE must develop is its ability to 
exploit CSAs in particular markets.  Locational capability thus refers to the idea that not all CSAs are 
readily available to all firms – and in this sense the ability to exploit a CSA is contingent upon a 
certain level of proficiency in managing certain firm specific location bounded assets, namely certain 
locational capabilities. The ability of EMNEs, however, to harness LB strategic assets like local 
reputation and brands may be weaker than that of DMNEs, owing to more limited locational 
capabilities. Brand management, advertising, public relations and consumer relationships are highly 
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important in high income developed, markets. EMNEs, however, with limited previous exposure to 
their management, may have limited capabilities to understand and deal with consumers in high 
income markets. It is thus no coincidence that they ‘generally have competitive disadvantages in 
global brands’, as high income markets are more foreign to them (Luo & Tung, 2018, p.140). 
Developing the locational capabilities to exploit brand value in developed markets may pose 
particularly significant challenges for EMNEs given their tacit nature and high degree of 
environmental embeddedness. Arguably, therefore, the value of certain strategic assets that are locally 
bounded, like domestic brands, may only be fully realized when the acquirer has attained a certain 
level of locational capabilities.  
Many LB assets, like local brands, may be more easily exploited between MNEs from geographic 
areas that exhibit greater similarities and lower psychic distances, as well as from MNEs with greater 
locational capabilities. This argument follows the reasoning of Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2001) 
that the relative location boundedness of assets can explain the tendency towards regional MNE 
expansion. As EMNEs are prone to undertake aggressive deals to comparatively distant developed 
markets (Deng, 2009), LB assets of psychically distant DMNE businesses may be difficult to fully 
exploit, owing to large psychic distances between home and host markets. By contrast, such 
challenges may be less acute for DMNE acquisitions, which are likely to be clustered more closely 
within similar regions, where better appreciation of similar markets may exist and stronger DMNE 
locational capabilities can be utilized, like that of local reputation.  
Implicit in much of the EMNE literature, like the springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2018) and 
bundling model (Hennart, 2012) is the idea that EMNEs are more strongly attracted to NLB assets. 
This is because their portability is required if they are to be utilized in their often large and 
comparatively fast growing domestic markets (Luo & Tung, 2018). At the same time, EMNEs may 
have weaker locational capabilities to manage assets with location bounded properties. Given these 
arguments, we might predict EMNEs to be less strongly attracted to NLB assets than DMNEs. 
Hypothesis 2. EMNEs are less strongly attracted to location bounded strategic assets than 
DMNEs when undertaking FDI. 
Methods 
Data and sample  
We explore potential differences in LB and NLB SAS M&A intensity and orientation using a sample 
of 2,414 international M&A deals undertaken between the beginning of 2012 and end of 2016. We 
focus on deals from MNEs from Brazil, Russia, India and China (i.e. the BRIC emerging markets) as 
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well as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). If there are differences between 
DMNEs and EMNEs in SAS orientation, the BRIC countries would seem likely to exhibit them, in 
part owing to their very large and generally fast growing domestic markets. As regards DMNE 
comparators, we use MNEs from the US and UK. These countries are host to many well-established, 
mature DMNEs. We focus on M&A as opposed to greenfield FDI because: (i) acquisitions are 
typically highlighted as a key means of SAS (Jing Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012); and (ii) acquisitions 
allows us to identify measurable proxies for NLB (patents) and LB (trademarks) strategic assets. Most 
acquisitions in the sample are from DMNEs (around 86%), as expected. China is the largest EMNE 
acquirer (6.7% of total), followed by India (3%), Russia, (2.1%) and Brazil (1.4%) (see Table 2).  
We first use the Thomson One database to collate all international M&A deals in our selected 
countries. Mathews (2006) argues that many EMNEs may initially take minority ownership shares in 
order to link, leverage and learn. We thus use all M&A deals that qualify as FDI following the 
OECD/IMF guideline of a 10% ownership share. We identify the parent firm’s country of origin by 
ultimate ownership. We record both parent and target firms of the M&A transactions in our sample 
countries. As Thomson One provides no firm-level financial or other company data, we match the 
target (to ascertain patents and trademarks owned at the time of acquisition) and acquirer firm names 
from Thomson One to the Orbis database (Bureau Van Dijk). Orbis provides data on over 140 million 
companies worldwide. It is increasingly used in International Busines research, owing to its wide and 
rich international coverage (Estrin et al., 2018; Jones & Temouri, 2016). We rely upon it extensively 
to gather firm-level details of the acquiring firms which we use for our main control variables.  
Model specification  
The purpose of our model is to explore the SAS related choices that MNE acquirers make when 
making international acquisitions and how acquirer’ characteristics influence these decisions. A 
multinomial logit model is suitable for this purpose. We specify four different choices for the 
acquiring MNE firm concerned, namely:  to acquire a target firm that holds no strategic assets (choice 
1), acquire a target with only trademarks (i.e. LB assets) (choice 2), acquire a firm with only patents 
(NLB) (choice 3), acquire a firm owning both trademarks and patents (both LB and NLB)(choice 4. 
The SAS choice is driven by country of origin as well as a range of acquirer’ firm-level factors: 
Choice of Strategic Asset Acquisition  Type (i.e. No Trademarks/Patents, Trademarks, Patents, 
Patents and Trademarks) t =   f (Dummy variables for EMNEs, incorporating 
China/Russia/Brazil/India, β1 Acquirer Patentsa, β2Acquirer Trademarks, β3Acquirer Experience, 
β4AcquirerBusinessGroupSizea, β5Acquirer Group Domestic Diversification, β6,  β7Industry 
relatedness between acquirer/target, β8 Total Assets, β9 Geographical diversification, Industry and 
year Dummies) 
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Variables and measurement 
Dependent variable: presence of patents/trademarks in the target firm 
As noted, there are various definitions of strategic assets (Meyer, 2015). In general, however, the 
EMNE literature near universally considers brands as strategic assets. One recent example of an SAS 
definition, for example, is ‘know-how, technologies, brands, equipment buildings and sites acquired 
or leased abroad with the aim of creating or extending advantages in the future’ (Petersen & Seifert, 
2014, p. 381)(emphasis added). NLB strategic assets, it is suggested, ‘can take two main forms. First, 
it may reflect a functional, production-related proprietary asset, typically technological, 
manufacturing or marketing knowhow. Second, it may refer to an organizational capability to 
efficiently coordinate and control the MNE’s asset base’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001: 238). The FSA 
concept is therefore very broad in coverage and difficult to capture empirically. Previous studies, 
moreover, have ‘failed to identify empirically or explain precisely the difference’ between NLB and 
LB strategic assets (Collinson & Rugman, 2008, p. 221). Here we use the ownership of at least one 
patent in the target firm to proxy for a choice of NLB strategic asset seeking by the acquirer.  For 
better or worse, patents are the most commonly used proxy for SAS activity in the extant EMNE 
literature (Alon, 2010; Buckley et al., 2007; Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2012; Jing Li et al., 2012). As 
discussed, NLB FSAs are typically considered to incorporate high levels of codified knowledge. 
Patents therefore fit this description well, as patenting involves explicit description of the intellectual 
property being registered. Such codified knowledge, moreover, contrasted with tacit knowledge, is 
more easily transferred between distinct national spaces (Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, & Manrakhan, 
2007).  
Local reputation, by contrast, is non-transferable. It qualifies, therefore, as a LB FSA (Verbeke & 
Kano, 2015). Brands, moreover, come to embody firm reputation by acting as an identifiable 
signaling mechanism, allowing products or services to be distinguished in the markets that they serve. 
Most brands of any value are typically registered as trademarks for the purposes of intellectual 
property rights protection.  Potentially, therefore, if trademarks are owned by a target firm they may 
proxy for LB FSAs. Using the existence of at least one trademark as a choice option, however, has 
several possible limitations. First, it may be that some brands are already recognized in the acquiring 
firms’ home market (i.e. their reputation has spread beyond the local market, giving them NLB 
properties). This is more likely to be the case in those target firms that have already developed a 
widespread presence in foreign markets. In order to discount the possibility of including these types of 
internationally recognized brands, we do not include the trademarks of any target firm that has 
undertaken FDI in the acquiring firms’ home country (i.e. it has a foreign subsidiary in the acquiring 
firms domestic market).  An evident limitation of using the presence of both trademarks and patents as 
choices for LB and NLB SAS respectively is that they do not account for trademark/patent volumes or 
values.  
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Independent and control variables 
We use a dummy variable for EMNEs as a group as well as by individual EMNE countries to capture 
the impact of individual country of origin on choice of SAS target, so providing for a more detailed 
understanding of which MNEs may be driving the results. Some MNEs, such as those from China, for 
example, have been singled out as more aggressive asset seekers than others (Hertenstein, Sutherland, 
& Anderson, 2015).   
We incorporate additional acquirer related control variables. Firstly, existing acquirer’ intangible 
assets, commonly used to reflect the degree of absorptive capacity, could influence propensity for 
SAS related deal-making (Makri, 2010).  We thus incorporate patent and trademark count as a proxy 
for firm level acquirer absorptive capacity and intangible assets (Table 1). The size and extent of 
domestic diversification of an acquirer’s corporate group may influence deal-making. This is 
particularly thought to be the case for emerging market firms, in which large diversified business 
groups are commonly involved in outward FDI activities, particularly SAS related deals. Such groups 
facilitate access to domestic internal capital  product and labor markets and share group wide 
resources, including those related to ‘project execution capability’ facilitating absorption of foreign 
strategic assets (Amsden & Hikino, 1994; Chari, 2013; Yiu, 2011). We therefore incorporate group 
size (number of firms) and an entropy measure of domestic group industrial diversification (Palepu, 
1985), based around the count of subsidiaries in different two digit SIC industry codes (owing to the 
relative dearth of sales and assets figures) (Delios, Xu, & Beamish, 2008). Acquirer firm age is 
included as one proxy for experience (Table 1) and subsidiary count of the acquirer is included to 
capture size at the level of the acquiring firm and its ability to manage multiple operations. 
Geographic diversification, again based on a two digit entropy count of both foreign and domestic 
subsidiaries provides a comprehensive measure of how internationally diversified the corporate group 
is. This again indicates experience and capabilities of managing international operations in the 
corporate group. Such measures of experience are important control variables, as a reason why many 
EMNEs are different relates to their relative levels of maturity and experience in managing 
international operations. The industrial relatedness of the target and acquirer may influence asset 
seeking orientation (i.e. it may be harder to digest unrelated deals) and we control for industry 
relatedness by including a dummy variable for similar target and acquirer NACE codes (at the four 
digit level), as well entirely unrelated deal-making (i.e. NACE code dissimilarity at the two digit 
level). 
***** Table 1 about here ***** 
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Results 
Multicollinearity issues are not a major consideration in our models (see Table 2). Correlation 
coefficients between our key explanatory variables (i.e. country of origin) and other explanatory 
variables are generally low, limiting the possible impacts upon significance testing of these variables. 
Results for the multinomial logistic regression are reported in Table 3 (the base group being target 
firms with no patents or trademarks) and average marginal effects estimations for country/group (i.e. 
EMNE grouping) of origin in Table 4.  
 
***** Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here ***** 
 
Table 3 includes a base model without the main EMNE explanatory variable (model A), one including 
it (i.e. the EMNE dummy, model B) as well as a model including the EMNE dummy decomposed 
further by individual country (i.e. China, Russia, India and Brazil, Model C). Looking at model fit 
statistics, the base model passes the likelihood ratio (LR) model fit test (p<0.001, Max. Likelihood R2 
= 0.073) as does model B (p<0.001, Max. Likelihood R2 =0.079). A subset of the predictors at very 
least, therefore, has non-zero effects in both models. More importantly, addition of the country of 
origin dummy in model B exhibits a significant increase in χ2 and an increase in the R2 (p<0.001).  
Thus model B, including the EMNE dummy grouping, increases the model’s explanatory power. This 
is also reflected in the fall of the Akaike Information Criterion, a sign that the model fit is improved 
enough to compensate for its increased complexity (Wulff, 2015). The country of origin dummy 
variables in model C similarly exhibits a significant increase in the χ2 and an increase in the R2 
(p<0.001), again reflected in the fall of the Akaike Information Criterion. In the case of individual 
country level reporting (Table 3, model C) Chinese MNEs appear more likely to acquire target firms 
that own patents (significant at the 1% level) as do Russian MNEs (10%) (both vis a vis the rest of 
sample group, i.e. including DMNEs originating from the UK and US). Chinese MNEs are also 
significantly and positively attracted towards targets simultaneously owning patents and trademarks 
(column 9). As regards trademark orientation, the EMNE coefficient in model B is negative but 
insignificant and in model C is negative for three of the four EMNE countries (China, Brazil, Russia) 
and is significant at the 5% significance level in the Russian case, indicating Russian MNEs are less 
likely to acquire a target with trademarks than their DMNE counterparts.  
Wulff (2015) notes that caution is required in using coefficients alone in determining the direction and 
scale of the relationship between independent variables and the likelihood of choosing specific 
alternatives. Instead, to be able to reach conclusions concerning such relationships, marginal effects 
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can be used. Table 4 estimates average marginal effects for the country and EMNE group dummy 
variables and computes these for models B and C from Table 3. Table 4 indicates hypothesis 1 is 
supported in the case of all EMNE (i.e. as a single group) but only at the 10% level of significance. 
The size of the marginal effects coefficient, however, is large (0.35), suggesting that if an EMNE 
target has patents the likelihood of an acquisition increases by 35% for an EMNE vis a vis the base 
case (no patents/trademarks) –  a considerable shift in the likelihood of undertaking a deal.  The 
results additionally provide evidence to show that it is Chinese MNEs in particular  that can be singled 
out as having a stronger patent seeking orientation than those from  Russia, Brazil and India. The 
coefficient on patents (NLB strategic assets) is positive and significant at the 5% significance level. 
Existence of patents in the target increases the likelihood of an acquisition by a Chinese MNE by 
8.9% and existence of patents and trademarks together increases it by 7.1% (at 10% significance 
level). Hypothesis 2, that EMNEs have a weaker LB asset seeking orientation, is supported only in the 
case of Russian MNEs.  The coefficient on ‘target owns trademarks’ is significant at the 1% level in 
the Russian case, however, which reduces the likelihood of an acquisition by a Russian MNE by 
8.3%.  
Taken collectively, based on both the significance and size of the effects, our results are not entirely 
straightforward to interpret.  There cannot be said to be overwhelming empirical evidence to support 
either of our hypotheses. Rather, mixed strands of supporting evidence exist, depending at what level 
and how one interprets them. Our preferred interpretation, however, is that they provide partial 
support for both hypotheses, albeit stronger support for hypothesis 1. As regards this hypothesis, the 
coefficient on the EMNE dummy, as noted, is significant at the 10% level for EMNE patent seeking 
choices. While this result appears strongly driven by Chinese MNEs, there is also additional support 
from Russian MNEs. In Table 3, for example, the coefficient on Russian MNEs patent choice is 
significant at the 10% level). In the marginal effects calculations, moreover, the sign is in the right 
direction (i.e. positive) and the p-value approaches the 10% significance level (Table 4). Individual 
Wald tests on the impact of dropping the origin country explanatory variables confirm it is primarily 
China and Russia which improves the overall model fit.  Taken together these results suggest a 
considerable EMNE orientation towards NLB strategic assets when compared to DMNEs.  
Compared to hypothesis 1, there is relatively less support for hypothesis 2, namely EMNEs are less 
likely to engage in an M&A when the target firm has more LB (trademark) assets (compared with 
DMNEs). The EMNE sample grouped as a whole (Table 4), shows no negative coefficient for 
EMNEs in the trademark category, as predicted (Model B, column 4). Looking at individual cases, 
however, Russian acquirer choices show a negative and highly significant impact towards targets that 
hold trademarks (Table 4), decreasing their likelihood of an acquisition by 8.3%. In addition, the 
coefficient on the marginal effects for trademark seeking for Chinese acquirers is negative (i.e. they 
are less likely to acquire a firm with trademarks) and also approaches a p-value of 0.1 (i.e. stands just 
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above the 10% significance level, at 0.12). We get this result, however, only when the Chinese sample 
is compared directly with the DMNE sample (i.e. excluding Brazilian, Russian and Indian MNEs and 
thus further decomposing our sample).This involves comparing 162 Chinese acquisitions with 2,242 
DMNE observations using the Chinese MNE dummy variable. Taken together, therefore, the general 
direction in signs and significance, particularly in the Chinese and Russian MNE cases, tends towards 
those hypothesized at the outset.  Finally, it is worth noting that although the multinomial logit 
modelling and marginal effects show no signs of significance for Indian or Brazilian MNEs, these two 
samples are comparatively small compared to the others. 
Robustness tests 
Our reported results use a parsimonious model. In additional tests we incorporated a broader range of 
acquirer firm-level explanatory variables to test the robustness of our results. This included acquirer 
profitability, net income, turnover, employees and the like. Owing to the availability of matched target 
and acquirer, however, our sample size was considerably reduced (to around 1,000 observations) 
when employing these variables. Despite this, it is important to note our basic results remained 
unchanged, with significant positive coefficients on Chinese and Russian MNEs seeking NLB assets 
and a negative coefficient on LB assets for Russian MNEs in all cases. The statistical significance of 
our results appears to be highly robust to different model specifications and sub-samples.  
Discussion  
New internalization theory, strategic asset seeking and EMNEs 
We used new internalization theory’s distinction between LB and NLB FSAs to explore how NLB 
and LB strategic assets influence choice of M&A targets in EMNE and DMNE international M&A 
deals. By using the distinction between LB and NLB assets we looked to further explore current 
EMNE related theories. Some of these have argued the domestic market is an important driver of 
EMNE related SAS (Hennart, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018; Petersen & Seifert, 2014). These 
approaches imply (but do not formally propose) that its strong gravitational pull, in part owing to 
asymmetric market access, may explain why EMNEs have a stronger SAS intensity towards NLB 
SAS than DMNEs but weaker attraction to LB assets. While our results are not entirely 
straightforward to interpret, our preferred interpretation is broadly in line with our, that EMNEs are 
more strongly attracted to NLB strategic assets (i.e. patents) but discouraged from acquisitions 
(compared with DMNEs) by LB strategic assets (i.e. trademarks).  
If this interpretation is correct, it is worth briefly reflecting on the implications for the many studies 
that have to date that remarked upon the strong SAS orientation of EMNEs.  Among these studies 
there are actually very few DMNE/EMNE comparisons, with several notable exceptions (Estrin et al., 
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2018; Jindra et al., 2016; Sutherland, Anderson, & Hertenstein, 2017).  Jindra et. al. (2016), 
summarizing extant literature, argue EMNEs start from a relatively disadvantageous competitive 
position which causes them to seek to enhance ‘their technological and commercial capabilities by 
following a learning-based knowledge-seeking OFDI strategies aimed at catching-up’ (Jindra et al., 
2016, p. 1168). Focusing on firm-level data including greenfield investments, they find that the 
location choices of EMNEs are positively affected by agglomeration economies and knowledge 
externalities. Their evidence supports the view that EMNEs ‘use outward foreign direct investment to 
augment ownership specific assets’ (Jindra et al., 2016, p. 1168).  Similarly, Estrin et al. (2018) in 
their econometric modelling find EMNEs have greater ‘sensitivity to IPR protection’ and they thus 
conclude from this they may also be pursuing SAS inspired catch-up strategies (Estrin et al., 2018, p. 
524). Our findings, however, do suggest a degree of caution is required in asserting EMNEs are 
different to DMNEs because they have a stronger SAS orientation. First, while this may be true for 
EMNEs from some countries (i.e. China and Russia) it may not necessarily be true for all. This 
finding is somewhat supported by the aforementioned comparative studies.  Second, and arguably of 
greater interest, our findings suggest a greater SAS orientation in international acquisitions, 
considered among the most important form of  EMNE catching-up strategy, is only the case for NLB 
assets (i.e. patents). By contrast, however, in the case of LB assets (i.e. trademarks) the reverse is 
actually true: their SAS orientation is weaker.  This finding contrasts quite firmly with the general line 
of argument and perception found in the literature on EMNEs.  Usually brands are mentioned as being 
among the key strategic assets sought by EMNEs. Yet, according to our findings and reasoning, the 
ability of EMNEs to effectively exploit value from such brands actually weakens their interest in 
acquiring them in a comparative sense (i.e. vis a vis DMNE as a comparator group).  
New internalization theory, with its focus on different types of FSAs, coupled with insights from the 
EMNE literature regarding the role of the domestic market as a potential driver of SAS orientation, is 
potentially useful with regards to better understanding these EMNE SAS behaviors. In particular, it 
draws our attention to the fact that not all strategic assets have the same properties. Thus grouping 
strategic assets into a general category of assets that help augment the FSAs of MNEs (be that at 
home or abroad), as many EMNE related studies have done to date, does not do full justice to the 
wide range of different foreign intangible assets that EMNEs (and DMNEs) may seek or, more 
importantly, where they may use them. In this regard, Meyer (2015) has argued that the definition of 
SAS should be widened from the original definition suggested by Dunning (and used extensively 
afterwards). Dunning’s definition, ‘to create or gain access to resources and capabilities that 
complement their existing core competencies’(Dunning, 1991, p.135 quoted in Meyer, 2015, p.23) , 
includes no mention of where the ‘strategic assets’ are to be deployed. According to Meyer (2015), 
however, a strategic asset should also incorporate the notion that the assets are to be used outside the 
country in which they are acquired. In other words, a strategic asset is one that can be used for 
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building global competitiveness and by definition is one with NLB properties. We are sympathetic to 
this concept of strategic assets and our findings may lend support to the idea that EMNEs do indeed 
seek these types of strategic assets – namely non-location-bounded assets.  
Are EMNEs still in the early ‘upward spiral’ stages of the ‘springboard act’?  
 While the longer term objective of many EMNEs may be to develop FSAs that will allow them to 
compete internationally, our results might be interpreted to support the argument that some EMNEs, 
particularly those from China and Russia, are still undergoing the earlier stages (i.e. stage 2) of an 
upward spiral springboard process (Luo & Tung, 2018).  We draw this conclusion as Luo and Tung’s 
(2018) popular springboard argument, updated now to an upward spiral process model for EMNEs, 
suggests earlier stages of the internalization process mainly involve ‘transferring acquired foreign 
strategic assets back home’ (p. 137). In stages one and two of the upward spiral, they argue, the 
domestic base is used as the ‘lynchpin’ and thus EMNEs primarily seek NLB strategic assets (which 
is what we have found). LB strategic assets, by contrast, remain relatively unattractive to them, as it is 
costly, for example, to directly transfer the reputation associated with a locally embedded brand to a 
foreign and unknown market (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007;  Lo et al., 2011). Extensive advertising 
and marketing activities must be undertaken locally to develop brand recognition for those brands that 
lack international recognition. More importantly, a level of locational capability may also be required 
if such brands are to be fully exploited (Zaheer & Nachum, 2011). As many EMNEs, moreover, lack 
experience in managing brands, specifically those targeted at developed market consumers and 
businesses (for producer markets), they rightly may be wary of acquiring such assets. By contrast, 
codified knowledge embodied in patents may be somewhat easier to absorb and transfer for an 
EMNE. Application of new internalization theory to the portability of strategic assets may play a 
complementary role in better understanding the outward FDI activities of EMNEs when combined 
with arguments from the EMNE literature (like the upward spiral model).  
The upward spiral model argues SEMNEs are eventually able to ‘catapult’ from their home bases 
‘with solidified capabilities’ (p. 137) – but that this takes time (i.e. referred to as stages four and five). 
It is at these stages that the upward spiral process implies greater attention towards location bounded 
assets, like brands, which provide greater potential for sustained competition in global markets. 
Indeed, as EMNEs move up through the upward spiral process, their domestic market becoming 
relatively less important to them, they may eventually become more similar to DMNEs.  Over time, 
the upward spiral model predicts EMNEs may develop their own locational capabilities, giving them 
the potential to exploit assets which are more tacit in nature and embedded more strongly in local 
environments. Indeed, while in the minority, some EMNEs from our sample have of course made 
foreign acquisitions with the purpose of acquiring a location bounded brand. In many cases they have 
done so specifically for the purposes of securing better access to developed markets (i.e. via 
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distribution networks) and moving further up the value chain. The Chinese juvenile products 
manufacturer of child car seats and pushchairs, Goodbaby, is one excellent example. It acquired 
Evenflo, a very well recognized US company owning 202 trademarks (but only 1 patent). In doing so 
Goodbaby moved from acting as an Evenflo sub-contractor (i.e. stages one and two of the upward 
spiral model) to having direct access to the US market and taking over its major competitors. The 
reputation of Evenflo appears to have been vital for Goodbaby’s success in the US market. Despite 
producing high quality car seats, many US based consumers were unwilling to place their trust in an 
unknown Chinese brand, particularly when it came to child safety (i.e. they were strongly risk-averse 
in these matters) (Ernst & Young, 2018). Thus the acquisition of the brand had a compelling 
economic logic. In this case, however, Goodbaby already possessed significant manufacturing and 
product development FSAs, meaning it was undertaking LB SAS from a position of FSA strength as 
well as considerable prior inward internationalization. While such cases exist, compared with DMNEs 
such EMNE firms remain comparatively less common. In short, the finding that some EMNEs, 
particularly those from China, are highly active in acquiring NLB assets is consistent with Luo and 
Tung’s (2018) updated springboard perspective, particularly the argument that many EMNEs are still 
in the earlier upward spiral stages of development. Our findings are also consistent with other EMNE 
related theories that implicitly incorporate the notion of transferability of strategic assets – like that of 
Hennart’s (2012 imperfect locational advantage argument and Petersen and Siefert’s (2014) 
asymmetric liability of foreignness argument. If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that many 
EMNEs are still in the earlier stages of catching-up with DMNE counterparts, in which the home base 
plays a larger role in driving outward FDI strategy (Hennart, 2010; Luo & Tung, 2018).  This also 
implies that many EMNEs still have a considerable way to go before they can truly compete with 
DMNEs on a transnational basis.  
Explaining country level differences in the SAS orientation  
An alternative interpretation of our results, of course, is that there is not enough consistency at the 
country level to reach any strong, generalized conclusion regarding preferences for LB and NLB 
strategic assets and the underlying causes of those differences. Indeed, one might argue that the fact 
both Brazil and India show no apparent difference to DMNEs in their SAS choices supports the 
position that in general EMNEs are essentially similar to DMNEs. Adopting this line of argument, 
therefore, it might by contrast be argued that one of the main findings of interest is the apparent 
exceptionality of Chinese MNEs and the relative normality of other EMNEs (vis a vis DMNEs) in 
their SAS orientation.  
As noted, according to Luo and Tung’s (2018, p.147) upward spiral perspective, ‘most SMNEs view 
their home base as the lynchpin of success’.  Our results could certainly be interpreted to provide 
some support for this idea in the case of Chinese MNEs. Domestic market growth has been 
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exceptional, outperforming other BRIC markets. Large domestic business groups, often diversified, 
have grown-up to dominate many domestic market niches. Foreign businesses in China, moreover, 
face government, legal and regulatory challenges on two main fronts, retarding their entry.  Barriers to 
entry for DMNEs occur firstly because China is an emerging market, characterized by a weak 
institutional environment (i.e. “institutional voids”). Judicial and regulatory systems are generally 
weaker than in higher income markets and, comparatively speaking, government procedures lack 
transparency. Standard everyday tasks, like obtaining permit and product approvals, for example, may 
become a drain on management resources.  Secondly, and arguably of more interest, China has long 
espoused ambitious domestic industrial policies to nurture its own national champion business groups 
with a view to them growing, one day, into internationally successful MNEs. The policy to build a 
‘national team’ of around one hundred large internationally competitive business groups, following an 
East Asian model of development (particularly Japan and South Korea, with large keiretsu and 
chaebol groups respectively), in fact dates to the early 1980s (Guest & Sutherland, 2009). The 
evolution in this policy to nurture domestic champions now spans over four decades and is reaching 
its zenith. The current China ‘Manufacturing 2025’ policies, for example, target ten specific industries 
(including new advanced information technology, automated machine tools and robotics, aerospace 
and aeronautical equipment, maritime equipment and high-tech shipping, modern rail- transport 
equipment, new-energy vehicles and equipment, power equipment, agricultural equipment; new 
materials; and biopharma and advanced medical products).  In areas such as new electric vehicles and 
battery technology, semiconductors, solar panels/modules and wind power, interventions have been 
extensive, ongoing and highly prominent (DRC & The World Bank, 2013). Semiconductors, for 
example, are reported to have received over $150 billion in government subsidies alone. According to 
the US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Chinese industrial policies in this 
sector ‘pose real threats to semiconductor innovation and US national security’ (Lucas, 2017). New 
battery technologies have similarly received great support, with large state-owned groups like CATL 
now emerging as one of the largest players on the world stage (Sanderson, Hancock, & Lewis, 2017). 
Similarly, support (and overcapacity) in wind and solar- power sectors have been prominent to date. 
In this light, it is perhaps not surprising that Chinese MNEs appear to be among the most aggressive 
seekers of NLB strategic assets (i.e. patents).  
As well as a strong domestic base, controlled but extensive inward internationalization has provided 
Chinese MNEs with vital domestic market learning opportunities, often within global value chains, so 
bolstering their absorptive capacity and appetite for foreign acquisitions (Hertenstein et al., 2015). 
While China has encouraged high levels of inward FDI, government industrial policies (like China 
manufacturing 2025) has in addition strongly negotiated for technology transfer from DMNE inward 
investors (by, for example, forcing DMNEs into joint-ventures and technology sharing partnerships 
(Nolan, 2013)), again facilitating learning. Interestingly, a growing body of empirical evidence shows 
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that Chinese MNEs have been comparatively successful in reverse knowledge transfer related to 
outward technology seeking FDI, implying the successful integration of NLB assets. Anderson et al. 
(2015), for example, consider the impact of foreign acquisitions on patenting activity in Chinese MNE 
parent firms, finding positive outcomes for them (Anderson et al., 2015). Similarly Fu et al. (2018), 
find positive impacts of Chinese FDI in developed countries on domestic innovation outputs (using 
survey data from MNEs in Guangdong province in 2010). They conclude that FDI ‘serves as an 
effective channel for latecomer firms to overcome internal resource constraints and leapfrog toward 
the technology frontier’ (Fu, Hou, & Liu, 2018, p. 111).  In addition, Amendolagine et al (2018) have 
looked at acquisitions of medium and high-tech firms in Europe and the US (during 2003–2011). 
They too found positive influences on innovation outcomes, particularly in cases where Chinese 
acquirers had sufficient absorptive capacity (Amendolagine, Giuliani, Martinelli, & Rabellotti, 2018). 
Li et al (2016) similarly  consider the effects of outward FDI on innovation performance but this time 
use regional panel data from Chinese provinces  (Li, Strange, Ning, & Sutherland, 2016). They find 
that outward FDI had a ‘very significant’ impact on domestic innovation (contingent again on 
provincial absorptive capacity) (p.1010). Taking a different but complementary angle, Piperopoulos et 
al (2018) find that Chinese MNEs can use outward FDI as a strategy to globalize R&D and enhance 
their innovation performance in their foreign subsidiaries, with potential links to parent firms 
(Piperopoulos, Wu, & Wang, 2018). In general, existing empirical research therefore shows Chinese 
MNE can  benefit domestically from technology seeking FDI.  
At a conceptual level, Hennart (2012) and Petersen and Seifert (2014) have explained why all EMNEs 
may enjoy abnormal rents when repatriating strategic assets to protected home markets (when 
compared to DMNEs that do not have such protection). However, while domestic market protection 
and asymmetries in liabilities of foreignness may certainly facilitate Chinese MNE NLB strategic 
asset seeking, it seems credible to argue that Chinese policy-makers, in creating sophisticated 
industrial policies to nurture internationally competitive big business groups (i.e. the ‘national team’), 
have undertaken interventions well beyond those found in other emerging markets (like Brazil and 
India). In this regard, it does not seem so unusual to find a stronger NLB orientation in Chinese 
MNEs. Alternatively, therefore, it might also be argued that simply having a large, fast-growing 
protected domestic market is not a sufficient condition for stronger NLB SAS activity (Hypothesis 1). 
Rather, it is only when accompanied by active government policy interventions that we are more 
likely to witness unusually high levels of NLB SAS activity. In other words, recourse to imperfect 
locational advantages (Hennart, 2012) or asymmetric liabilities of foreignness (Petersen and Siefert, 
2012) partially explains our results. It is, however,  the role of state interventions and policy that also 
play a decisive factor in facilitating these types of protection as well as further encouragements (i.e. 
soft loans) which incentivize strategic asset seeking. 
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Conclusion 
To date few studies have distinguished between the different types of strategic assets sought by 
EMNEs or how the properties of these assets may vary. Comparisons between EMNEs from the 
major BRIC economies and those with other DMNEs, moreover, are also relatively scarce. As a 
result, the EMNE literature has applied general models of SAS to quite a wide variety of different 
scenarios, each shaped by different underlying initial FSA conditions. New internationalization 
theory, with its distinction between the location boundedness properties of FSAs (and hence also 
strategic assets), is useful in providing further insights into EMNE SAS and is a useful lens and 
complement through which to reinterpret some of the literature and theory on EMNEs. Our 
comparative empirical analysis of NLB and LB SAS in DMNEs and EMNEs indicates there are 
differences in the SAS intensity of EMNEs and DMNEs with regards to location and non-location 
bounded strategic assets, albeit this is primarily in certain cases (i.e. China and Russia). We have 
found, moreover, that EMNEs are more strongly engaged in SAS in pursuit of NLB assets only. 
EMNEs thus appear to seek strategic assets with specific types of properties. It is therefore an 
oversimplification to argue that EMNEs are different to DMNEs because of the greater intensity of 
their asset seeking orientation. Rather, it is also the differences in the qualitative nature of this asset 
seeking orientation that is of note.  
Policy implications 
The China-US geopolitical relationship has become increasingly tied to China’s acquisition of foreign 
strategic assets and associated domestic market protection and ongoing industrial policies. Ongoing 
trade negotiations in early 2019, for example, centred on Chinese state subsidies, government directed 
credit (via the state controlled banking system) and public procurement, as well as forced technology 
transfer. China has been accused of using domestic legal, regulatory and government interventions to 
favour its domestic firms. Policy-makers in China, at present, appear unlikely to deviate from their 
commitment towards state orchestrated capitalism (currently only “cosmetic, non-impactful offers” on 
Chinese subsidies have been made, for example, and current negotiations with China have been 
likened by US negotiators to “pulling teeth” owing to China’s “stonewalling on market access”) ” 
(Toplensky, 2019). Similar to the US, sentiment in the European Union has swung strongly against 
what are increasingly now perceived as discriminatory Chinese domestic interventions. KUKA’s 
acquisition by Midea Group in 2016 ignited the national debate within Germany and in turn led to a 
significant change, led by Angela Merkel, in the mind-set of European Union leaders.  Following 
increased political pressures Margarethe Vestager, head of the EU competition commission, has  
acknowledged that it is “more and more obvious” the market openness between the EU and China is 
“an asymmetrical thing” (Toplensky, 2019). European leaders as a result are now looking to reform 
competition rules to create a system that may be more in line with a European wide strategic industrial 
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policy. China’s state capitalism model is therefore drawing strong responses in both Europe and the 
US. Current geopolitical interactions between the US, EU and China appear to testify to the deep 
concern about asymmetric industrial interventions that the China has put in place to facilitate firm-
level catch-up. Our results show China to be different in its SAS orientation compared to other 
emerging markets like India and Brazil, it being a more aggressive asset seeker of NLB strategic 
assets that can be employed domestically, as well potentially in global operations. These results 
confirm the concerns of many Western policy-makers regarding China’s strategic intentions in its 
overseas investment activities.  
Limitations and further research  
Some may take issue with our proxies for NLB and LB strategic assets. It is, however, worth keeping 
in mind that there is very limited empirical research to date in this area. To our knowledge, only 
several studies have tried to empirically explore how location boundedness influences outward FDI 
and strategy (Lo et al., 2011). We cannot completely rule out the possibility that our results are biased 
by differences in geographical coverage in this database (i.e. the level of detail is higher for DMNEs, 
leading to biases in the CMNE/DMNE samples). Future research might further explore the impact of 
the location boundedness properties of strategic assets and FSAs on SAS strategies in both DMNEs 
and EMNEs, to further ascertain similarities and differences, using alternative data sources. 
Understanding the impact of existing FSAs (in the acquiring firm) on the propensity of EMNEs to 
engage in LB and NLB SAS is a potentially fruitful area for future research. Are, for example, firms 
with strong existing NLB strategic assets more likely to engage in either NLB (due to easier 
digestion) or LB (complementary resources) in the host market? The impact of strategic asset location 
boundedness on FDI is an under-researched area ripe for expansion. 
Our sample size is not adequately large in the cases of some of EMNE sample, for example Russian 
and Brazilian MNEs, to detect any significant differences (Table 2). The number of observations is 
relatively low. It is also possible that the particular domestic institutional environments in these 
countries is not as supportive, both in terms of domestic protection, as well as in terms of incentives 
for outward SAS related FDI. Clearly more detailed comparative work considering SAS orientation of 
EMNEs from these BRIC markets is required.   
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Table 1:  Variable descriptions 
Variable Description 
 Acquirer patents Patent count in the acquiring firm at the time of acquisition as a 
proxy for absorptive capacity  
Acquirer trademarks Trademark count in the target firm at time of acquisition as a 
proxy for the impact of  LB strategic assets 
Acquirer firm age Number (count) of years from organization incorporation to 2016 
Total assets of 
acquiring firm 
Total assets at time of acquisition of the acquirer 
Subsidiaries  Number of subsidiaries controlled by the acquirer 
Corporate group 
geographic 
diversification 
An entropy measure of geographic diversification based around 
count of foreign and domestic subsidiaries 
Corporate group 
domestic 
diversification 
 
Two digit SIC code entropy measure of diversification, based on 
count of companies in the corporate group (sales data not widely 
available for all subsidiaries)Log of number of firms in the 
corporate group (i.e. owned by an ultimate owner), reflecting 
group wide resources available to acquirer 
SIC 4 digit match  Matching SIC codes at four digit level capturing similarity in 
business activities of acquirer and target firm 
SIC, no relationship 
 
By contrast, dissimilarity in main business lines may make 
technological acquisitions less attractive owing to challenges in 
integrating dissimilar activities, captured by no match in SIC 
code at below two digit level 
Corporate group size Group size based on global ultimate ownership information, 
reflecting group wide resources available to acquirer  
Year and industry 
dummies 
Dummy variables at two digit NACE codes to control for 
industry, year dummies 
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Table 2: correlation matrix and descriptive statistics.  
 
Variables Mean  s.d (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  (1) China 0.067 0.25 1.000 
  (2) Brazil 0.014 0.12 -0.032* 1.000 
  (3) Russia 0.021 0.14 -0.039* -0.018 1.000 
  (4) India 0.03 0.17 -0.047* -0.021 -0.026 1.000 
  (5) Patents_acq 131.7 2119 0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.011 1.000 
  (6) Trademrks_acq 26.7 184 -0.036* -0.011 -0.020 -0.024 0.201* 1.000 
  (7) Age 67.7 47.6 -0.088* 0.007 -0.046* -0.053* 0.005 0.019 1.000 
  (8) Total assets 845000 7.85e+07 -0.002 -0.004 0.006 -0.018 0.119* 0.139* 0.090* 1.000 
  (9) Subsidiaries 48.1 296.4 -0.029 -0.006 -0.010 -0.025 0.237* 0.162* 0.045* 0.455* 1.000 
  (10) Geogr. Div. 0.625 0.93 -0.055* -0.001 -0.046* -0.067* 0.095* 0.144* -0.087* 0.009 0.109* 1.000 
  (11) Dom. Div. 0.354 0.68 0.223* 0.015 0.159* -0.055* 0.014 0.010 -0.049* 0.037 0.078* 0.460* 1.000 
  (12) SIC 3match 0.10 0.31 -0.032* 0.005 -0.016 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.022 -0.025 0.024 -0.017 1.000 
  (13) SIC no match 0.32 0.47 0.073* -0.026 0.050* -0.026 0.017 0.021 -0.022 0.011 0.023 -0.010 0.067* -0.230* 1.000 
  (14) Group size 3.11 2.40 0.037* 0.007 0.033* -0.028 0.076* 0.118* -0.203* 0.150* 0.195* 0.429* 0.390* -0.015 0.016 1.000 
   
  * shows significance at the .05 level  
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Table 3: Results of Multinomial Regression using EMNEs as group and by individual country or EMNE origin.  
 
  Model A          Model B  Model C  
Variables  
(1) 
Target 
owns 
trademarks 
(2) 
Target 
owns 
patents 
(3) 
Target  
patents/ 
trademarks 
(4) 
Target 
owns 
Trademarks 
(5) 
Target 
owns 
Patents 
(6) 
Target 
patents/ 
trademarks 
(7) 
Target 
owns 
Trademarks 
(8) 
Target 
owns 
Patents 
(9) 
Target 
patents/ 
trademarks 
 
Patents  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trademarks 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Total Assets -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidiaries  -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Geographic diversification -0.071 0.252*** 0.244*** -0.077 0.288*** 0.265*** -0.098 0.337*** 0.294*** 
 
(0.077) (0.085) (0.076) (0.079) (0.087) (0.078) (0.080) (0.088) (0.079) 
Domestic diversification 0.018 -0.250* -0.092 0.029 -0.310** -0.130 0.076 -0.423*** -0.212* 
 
(0.099) (0.131) (0.116) (0.103) (0.133) (0.119) (0.109) (0.136) (0.122) 
SIC code 4 digit match 0.507** -0.394 0.435** 0.507** -0.398 0.432** 0.520** -0.396 0.440** 
 
(0.202) (0.310) (0.211) (0.202) (0.310) (0.211) (0.202) (0.311) (0.212) 
SIC, no relationship -0.174 -0.031 -0.010 -0.170 -0.053 -0.024 -0.154 -0.080 -0.042 
 
(0.148) (0.172) (0.159) (0.148) (0.172) (0.160) (0.148) (0.174) (0.160) 
Corporate group size  0.039 0.055 -0.002 0.039 0.058 0.000 0.039 0.059 0.000 
 
(0.034) (0.042) (0.039) (0.034) (0.042) (0.039) (0.034) (0.042) (0.039) 
EMNE     -0.083 0.466** 0.288    
    (0.207) (0.226) (0.214)    
Chinese MNEs 
   
   -0.090     1.117***   0.910*** 
    
   (0.297) (0.284) (0.260) 
Brazilian MNEs 
   
   -0.165 0.085 0.409 
    
   (0.549) (0.626) (0.510) 
Russian MNEs 
   
   -1.229** 0.738* -0.089 
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   (0.612) (0.439) (0.544) 
Indian MNEs 
   
   0.233 0.169 -0.595 
    
   (0.332) (0.419) (0.530) 
Constant -1.913*** -2.634*** -1.938*** -1.901*** -2.723*** -1.989*** -1.938*** -2.809*** -2.018*** 
 
(0.224) (0.286) (0.238) (0.225) (0.291) (0.241) (0.227) (0.297) (0.245) 
McFadden's R2 0.043 0.043 0.043    0.051 0.051 0.051 
Max. Likelihood R2 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.089             0.089             0.089             
Akaike Information 
Criterion 1.853            1.853            1.853            0.079 0.079 0.079 1.852 1.852 1.852 
    1.853 1.853 1.853    
χ2 (LR) 191.8*** 191.8*** 191.8*** 197.6*** 197.6*** 197.6*** 225.6*** 225.6*** 225.6*** 
Change in χ2 
 Model A     5.812*** 5.812*** 5.812*** 33.8*** 33.8*** 33.8*** 
          
Observations 2,414 2,414 2,414 2,414 2,414 2,414 2,414 2,414 2,414 
 
Note:  Year and industry dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Multinomial model base: acquires target with neither patents nor trademarks. 
Model explores impact of country of origin (i.e. EMNE or not) on type of SAS target preference.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: The Average Marginal Effects of Country of Origin on the Probability of Choosing to 
Acquire Different Kinds of Strategic Assets 
Based on Models B and C in Table 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 No patents/ 
trademarks 
Target owns   
trademarks only                     
Target owns patents  
only 
Target owns 
patents/trademarks 
     
Chinese MNEs  -0.13*** -0.029   0.089** 0.071* 
 (-0.048) (-0.026) (0.04) (0.038) 
Brazilian MNEs -0.0258 -0.0148 0.00921 0.0314 
 (0.079) (0.051) (0.049) (0.06) 
Russian MNEs 0.037 -0.0832*** 0.0613 -0.0151 
 (0.069) (0.025) (0.058) (0.048) 
Indian MNEs 0.0319 0.0151 0.00167 -0.0487 
 (0.056) (0.042) (0.035) (0.031) 
All EMNEs  -0.41 -0.16 0.35* 0.22 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.02) 
Observations 2,414 2,414 2,414 2,414 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Table 4 estimates average marginal effects for the country and EMNE group dummy variables 
based on models B (for EMNEs as a group) and C (for individual countries) from Table 3.  
 
 
